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Introduction
In July 2007, a group of Italian investors sued an Italian dairy and
food corporation, Parmalat Finanziaria S.p.A. (Parmalat), under the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act for damages sustained as a result of massive fraud.1
The alleged fraud occurred in Italy, but the Italian plaintiffs sued in federal
district court in New York. 2 Why would Italian plaintiffs sue an Italian
company in an American court for fraud that occurred in Italy? The
answer is simple: in 2007, Italy did not allow class actions for damages,3
and the projected cost of litigation relative to the expected recovery made
t J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2010; Ph.D., Cornell University, 2008. The
author thanks Professor Kevin Clermont for his comments on an earlier draft.
1. In re Parmalat Securities Litigation, 497 F. Supp. 2d 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
2. See, e.g., id. at 532 (noting that plaintiff did not allege that any fraudulent acts or
omissions by Parmalat's auditors took place in the US). The threshold issue before the
court concerned the extraterritorial limits of the application of the Securities and
Exchange Act (SEA). See id. at 531. The court held that SEA did not apply, in part,
because the alleged fraud took place abroad. See id. ("Conduct in the United States will
support application of the securities laws only when 'substantial acts in furtherance of
the fraud were committed within the United States.' . . . In contrast, 'where the United
States activities are merely preparatory or take the form of culpable nonfeasance and are
relatively small in comparison to those abroad,' the securities laws do not apply.").
3. See, e.g., BEUC, Eur. Consumers' Org., Private Group Actions Taking Europe
Forward: BEUC Reflections on a Future European Collective Redress Scheme for Individ-
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the individual pursuit of the plaintiffs' claims against Parmalat financially
unattractive. 4
For over thirty years, this has been a somewhat common story5
because, despite its pervasiveness in the United States, the class action,
which allows individuals to sue not only for injury they suffer but also on
behalf of other persons similarly injured, remains a "unique American
legal institution."6 If one believes Meglena Kuneva, the current European
Consumer Commissioner, Europe has no intention to change that. The
Commissioner predicts that the old continent will never "go down [the
American class action] road" with its "toxic cocktail" of contingency fees,
punitive damages, and pretrial discovery. 7 However, a growing movement
toward private enforcement of consumer protection laws in the majority of
European countries tells a different story.8 This Note analyzes the develop-
ment of the Italian class action system from its inception in the original
draft legislation of 2007 (Original Draft)9 to the final version enacted into
law in January 2010 (Final Draft). 10 The Note concludes that these two
sequential attempts to produce a workable opt-in model for class action
fail.
The analysis in the Note develops in four stages. 1 First, I demon-
ual Damage Claims 24-25 (Aug. 26, 2008) [hereinafter BEUC Reflections] (discussing
the development of Italy's approach to collective actions for damages).
4. See Commission Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, COM (2008) 794
final (Nov. 27, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress cons/green-
paper-en.pdf ("Currently, when [European] consumers affected by a malpractice want
to pursue a case, they face barriers in terms of access, effectiveness and affordability.
This is particularly true for claims that involve small amounts. [One of] Itihe sectors in
which consumers find it most difficult to obtain redress for mass claims are financial
services (39% of documented cases) .... ").
5. See generally Iliana T. Buschkin, Note, The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a
Globalized Economy- Permitting Foreign Claimants to be Members of Class Actions Law-
suits in U.S. Federal Courts, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1563 (2005). The practice begins in
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 977-78 (2d Cir. 1975), where three non-
U.S. citizens joined in a class action against a Canadian company for violation of the
securities laws.
6. Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continental Europe? A
Preliminary Inquiry, 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 217, 218 (1992).
7. Meglena Kuneva, Eur. Consumer Comm'r, Press Conference Speaking Points:
"Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress" (Nov. 27, 2008), http://europa.eu/
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/657.
8. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, Group Litigation Under Foreign Legal Systems: Vari-
ations and Alternatives to American Class Actions, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 401, 402 (2002)
[hereinafter Group Litigation]; see also BEUC Reflections, supra note 3, at 21-28 (show-
ing that as of January 1, 2008, fourteen of the twenty-seven European Union Members
have some form of collective redress available).
9. See Legge 24 Dicembre, n. 244, art. 2, para. 445-449, Dec. 24, 2007, in Gazz.
Uff. 12 Gennaio 2008, n. 8 [hereinafter Original Draft] (providing legal framework for
collective actions in Italy).
10. See Legge 23 Luglio 2009, n. 99, art. 49, para. 14, in Gazz. Uff. 31 Luglio 2009,
n. 176, Supplemento Ordinario, n. 136 [hereinafter Final Draft]. The final draft went
into effect in January 2010.
11. An earlier version of this note was completed before the introduction of the final
draft and focused exclusively on concerns about the original draft. The final draft con-
firmed the adequacy of this prior analysis insofar as it addressed some of the concerns
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strate that the original draft was defective and would have proved ineffec-
tive in enforcing plaintiffs' rights. Second, I explain that the defects that
are commonly associated with other European group litigation devices-
lack of funding, insufficient plaintiff participation, and insufficient finality
for class action defendants-did not affect the original draft. Third, I argue
that the defect of the original draft consisted in the way in which it solved
two of these problems: insufficient participation and insufficient finality.
More specifically, the draft's restrictions on standing and its odd res judi-
cata rule for class action judgments would have given rise to either
underbidding settlement wars between class action representatives or col-
lusive settlements between these representatives and defendants. In either
case, the result would have been inadequate settlements and underenforce-
ment of consumer rights. Fourth, I show that the final draft aims to
address precisely these collateral costs, but, to the extent it succeeds, it
threatens to reintroduce in the system the danger of insufficient plaintiff
participation. 12 In ultimate diagnosis, the residual defects of the Italian
system reveal an inherent flaw in the opt-in model for class participation.
The Note is organized in two parts. Part I introduces the original draft
by comparing it with other European group litigation devices and the
American class action system. Part II identifies the original draft's short-
comings as a tool for enforcing plaintiffs' rights, explains the way in which
the final draft addresses these shortcomings, and concludes with a list of
residual concerns.
Why is this topic important? Despite its inadequacies, the new Italian
system finally brings American-style class action to Europe. This is good
news for both Italian and American consumers: as courts in Italy, and
more broadly in Europe, enforce class action judgments rendered by Italian
courts, they will become more hospitable to enforcing class action judg-
ments rendered in American courts. 13 At least, the philosophical justifica-
tion for closely scrutinizing American class action judgments in European
courts stands to lose its main purchase. 14
about the original draft. The last section of this note discusses a new set of problems
created by the final draft.
12. The final draft went into effect in January 2010.
13. See Richard H. Dreyfuss, Class Action Judgment Enforcement in Italy: Procedural
and "Due Process" Requirements, 10 TULJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 5, 7 (2002) ("Foreign courts
are more likely to scrutinize the procedural aspects when presented with American judg-
ments resulting from class actions because the procedure is unique and, to most legal
practitioners in the rest of the world, largely unfamiliar."). This is especially true for
judgments that do not involve punitive damages. See Michele Taruffo, Some Remarks on
Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective, 11 DUKEJ. COMp. & INT'L L. 405, 414 (dis-
cussing European jurisdictions' discomfort with punitive damages).
14. See Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 6, at 264 (discussing the philosophical reser-
vations that the Europeans harbor about the American class action).
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I. Introducing the Italian Class Action System
A. Previous Studies on Group Litigation Devices in Europe and
Methodology
In the last decade, the European movement toward establishing group
litigation devices for private enforcement of consumer rights has fascinated
American scholars.1 5 One explanation for this is simple. As Professors
Issacharoff and Miller explain, "[Tor countries steeped in the civil law tra-
dition, the move away from centralized public enforcement is a sea change
in legal structures." 16 For a long time, the Europeans have considered the
American class action system to be philosophically troubling,1 7 legally
untidy,18 and practically perverse. 19 But in the last decade this attitude
has changed; there is an emerging consensus among European legislatures
and legal scholars that, in one form or another, group litigation is neces-
sary to deal with numerous consumer injuries that arise in the context of
mass production and global markets. 20 The consensus has led to experi-
mentation with various group litigation devices that differ fundamentally
with the American class action system.2 1
Previous comparative studies have focused on these differences. 22
This Note shifts the focus to a comparison between the Italian class action
regime and other group litigation devices already implemented in
Europe. 23 It demonstrates that the Italian experiment is a significant
advance by explaining how close it comes to a full-blown, American-style
class action.24
Many previous studies have also looked at group litigation in Europe
from a level of generality that allows for an understanding of its signifi-
15. See, e.g., Samuel P. Baumgartner, Class Actions and Group Litigation in Switzer-
land, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 301 (2007); Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 6; Richard
Cappalli, The Style and Substance of Civil Procedure Reform: Comparison of the United
States and Italy, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 861 (1994); Mauro Cappelletti, Gov-
ernmental and Private Advocates for the Public Interest in Civil Litigation: A Comparative
Study, 73 MICH. L. REV. 794 (1975); P. H. Lindblom & G. D. Watson, Complex Litigation
- A Comparative Perspective, 12 C. J. Q. 33 (1993); Harald Koch, Non-Class Group Litiga-
tion Under EU and German Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 355 (2001); Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr., Debates Over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective: What Can We Learn
From Each Other, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 157 (2001); Edward F. Sherman, From
"Loser Pays" to Modified Offer of Judgment Rules: Reconciling Incentives to Settle with
Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1863 (1998) [hereinafter Loser Pays]; Group Litigation,
supra note 8; Gerhard Walter, Mass Tort Litigation in Germany and Switzerland, 11 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 369 (2001).
16. See Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to
Europe?, 62 VND. L. REV. 179, 180 (2009).
17. See Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 6, at 219.
18. See Taruffo, supra note 13, at 414-17.
19. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 16, at 179.
20. See Kuneva, supra note 7 (discussing the necessity of a collective action
mechanism).
21. See infra notes 76-92 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 15.
23. See infra notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
24. Id.
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cance and breadth-the entire continent.25 This Note takes a different
approach. It looks at one European class action device in particular: Italy's
new class action regime for damages. 26 To that extent, it sacrifices breadth
for detail, but it does so for the purpose of highlighting the significance of
the Italian experiment for the future of class action in Europe.
The Note differs from previous studies also with respect to methodol-
ogy. The analysis focuses on the details of the Italian regime, not simply
for the sake of comparison, but to predict the regime's efficacy as a tool for
enforcing consumer rights and deterring future wrongful conduct. 27 The
predictions rely on both classic armchair analysis and inferences from
empirical studies on American class action practice. With these prelimina-
ries out of the way, the next section places the Italian class action regime in
the context of the recent European experiments with group litigation.
B. The Philosophical and Legal Background of the Italian Class Action
System
The new Italian class action regime that went into effect in January
2010 is the boldest step in the European Union movement to enforce con-
sumer protection laws through group litigation devices.28 Unlike other
European group litigation devices, which "offer [I behavioral remedies
backed up by meager monetary penalties, '2 9 Italy's new law establishes a
class action regime for damages.30 This development moves Italy's private
enforcement mechanism away from its continental counterparts and closer
to the American-style class action system under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure3 ' and similar state procedural devices. 32
In the past, Italy, like other European countries, flirted with the idea
of implementing a class action system, but ultimately found the institution
"troubling. '33 The concerns were, in part, practical in nature.34 For exam-
ple, a class action system would shrink the power of attorney requirement
from all represented parties to the named party,3 5 and it would require
additional "management and sanctioning" authority for judges to handle
the action at a reasonable pace. 36 These measures, in turn, were inconsis-
25. See, e.g., Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 6; Cappelletti, supra note 15; Lindblom
& Watson, supra note 15; Group Litigation, supra note 8; Loser Pays, supra note 15;
Rowe, supra note 15. But see Baumgartner, supra note 15; Cappalli, supra note 15; Koch,
supra note 15; Walter, supra note 15.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 58-75, 181-209.
27. See discussion infra Part I.B, C.
28. See Casey W. Halladay & Marco Amorese, Halladay and Amorese on Understand-
ing Italy's New Class Action Regime, 2008 EMERGING IssuEs 2609, (Sept. 29, 2008)
(LEXIS).
29. See id. at 3.
30. See Original Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 446(1).
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
32. See Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 6, at 257.
33. See id. at 219-20.
34. See id. at 261-62.
35. Id. at 261.
36. Id. at 262.
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tent with the Italian law and would have required readiness on the part of
the legislature to revamp the relevant procedural restrictions. 37
Certain "conceptual and philosophic[al]" concerns, however, were the
main stumbling block to the adoption of American-style class action in
Italy, and more generally in Europe. 38 Prominent among these concerns
was what some commentators call "the dogma of... 'exaggerated individu-
alism'."39 In the European procedural mindset, the individual whose rights
are implicated must have control over the course of litigation.40 Theoreti-
cally, the class action device, by its very nature, dilutes the control of the
individual in favor of an abstract entity-the class of plaintiffs. 41 American
practice shows that control over litigation shifts even further from the class
itself to the attorney representing its interests. 42 This outcome conflicts
with bedrock European beliefs about the personal nature of legal rights,
and the limited and technical role of lawyers in the course of civil
litigation.43
Professor Koch highlights a different explanation for the European
resistance to American-style class action.44 Europeans "entrust the public
interest to public institutions rather than to private law enforcers," like the
class action plaintiff.45 Recent reforms in some European countries illus-
trate Europe's continued preference for a top-down legislative approach to
the expeditious resolution of large numbers of related claims for
damages.46
European's distrust of class actions also flows from what can be fairly
described as guilt by association. Europeans often associate the American
class action system with its financing mechanism -the contingency fees for
plaintiffs' attorneys.47 Contingency fees continue to be illegal in most
European countries, and they sit badly with the understood role of the law-
yer as a "technical auxiliary" rather than a player with a profit-making inter-
est in the outcome of the litigation.48
37. See id. at 261.
38. See id. at 219, 263; see also Koch, supra note 15, at 357-58.
39. See Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 6, at 264.
40. See id.
41. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 678 (1986) [hereinafter Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney] ("[i]n
the context of class and derivative actions, it is well understood that the actual client
generally has only a nominal stake in the outcome of the litigation.").
42. See generally John C. Coffee,Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Bal-
ancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 877 (1987)
[hereinafter Entrepreneurial Litigation] (arguing that clients have no actual control over
the class action attorney in large class action litigation).
43. See Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 6, at 275, 290.
44. See Koch, supra note 15, at 357-58.
45. Id. at 358.
46. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 16, at 182, 208-09; see also infra notes
87-88 and accompanying text (discussing so-called "funds solutions").
47. Kuneva, supra note 7.
48. See Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 6, at 290.
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Despite these philosophical misgivings, in 1998, the European Com-
mission issued a directive compelling member states to adopt legislation
that would allow "qualified entities" 49 to seek injunctive relief on behalf of
a class of consumers for violations of European Union consumer protec-
tion laws. 50 Italy first implemented the directive by allowing consumer
protection organizations that were registered with the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Development 5 ' to act as plaintiffs in actions to enforce the consum-
ers' "collective rights."'5 2 "Collective rights" is a heterogeneous category
that includes "the right to health protection, the right to the quality and
safety of products, the right to receive adequate information, the right to be
exposed to truthful advertisement, and the right to fairness and clearness
in contracts."5 3 If the consumer organization succeeded in obtaining an
injunction and the defendant failed to comply, the court could fine the
defendant within a range set by law.
5 4
In a nutshell, until recently, the group litigation system in Italy offered
injunctive relief supported by minor fines but did not allow collective
actions for damages.5 5 Its short history has shown that the system does
little to "encourage compliance by 'deep pocket' defendants" who can delay
implementing the injunctions by simply paying the relatively meager penal-
ties. 56 The case of Microsoft, which chose to pay C1 billion in penalties for
abuse of dominant market position rather than comply with the injunction
to disclose source codes, is a telling illustration.
57
C. The Elements of the Original Draft of the Italian Class Action
System
At least in principle, the goal of the new Italian class action system is
to offer a more deterrent alternative. 58 The main elements the system's
original draft can be grouped into five categories: (1) the requirements for
standing; (2) the nature of admissible claims; (3) the notice requirements
and class membership; (4) the trial process and the determination of dam-
ages; and (5) the res judicata effect of judgments. 59
49. See Council Directive 98/27, 1998 OJ. (L 166) 51 (EC). The directive defines
"qualified entities" broadly as "any body or organization which ... has a legitimate
interest in ensuring" compliance with EU consumer protection provisions. Id. art. 3.
The category includes both independent public bodies and private consumer protection
organizations. See id.
50. See id. arts. 1-2.
51. Decreto Legislativo 6 Settembre 2005, n. 206, art. 37, in Gazz. Uff. 8 Ottobre
2005, n. 235 [hereinafter Legislative Decree].
52. Id. art. 139.
53. ELISABETTA SILVESTRI, CTR. SOCIO-LEGAL STUD., THE GLOBALIZATION OF CLASS
AcTIONS: ITALIAN REPORT 6 (2007), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/
images/dynamic/events media/Italian NationaLReport.pdf.
54. Legislative Decree, supra note 48, art. 140(7). Fines range from 516 to 1,032
per day. Id.
55. See Halladay & Amorese, supra note 28, at 3.
56. See id.
57. See id.; Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 4024.
58. See Halladay & Amorese, supra note 28, at 6.
59. See id. at 1; Original Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 446(5).
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First, consumer protection organizations registered with the Ministry
of Economic Development that enjoyed standing in an action for injunction
under the old system continued to have standing under the proposed
law.60 The proposed law, however, expanded standing to include other
associations that were "adequately representative" (adeguatamente rap-
presentativi) of the collective consumer interests at stake.6 1 This second
category remained undefined.6 2
Second, as to the nature of admissible claims, a proponent with stand-
ing could bring a class action for damages whenever the collective interests
of consumers were harmed by the defendant's tortious conduct (atti illecitti
extracontrattuali), unfair commercial practices (pratiche commerciali scor-
rette), or anticompetitive practices, (comportamenti anticoncorrenziali).63
Based on these criteria, the court would determine in its initial hearing
whether a claim was admissible.6 4 The claim would be admissible unless it
was "manifestly unfounded" (manifestamente infondata), there was a con-
flict of interest, or the court did not find a collective interest suitable for
class representation. 6 5
Third, once the proponent of the action convinced the court at the
initial hearing that the claim was admissible, the proponent was responsi-
ble for publishing the contents of the claim in the media to notify potential
members of their right to participate in the class. 6 6 From the time notice
was published, through the appeals process, and up until the time of a
dispositive ruling on the case, consumers who wished to participate could
become class-members by communicating in writing to the proponent their
decision to join the collective action.6 7
Fourth, if after trial the court ruled in favor of the class action plaintiff,
it issued a declaratory judgment that prescribed the criteria under which
damages for individual class members would be calculated.68 Depending
on the nature of the defendant's acts, the court could also determine the
"floor" recovery for class participants. 69 The defendant could make a pay-
ment proposal to the plaintiffs anytime within sixty days of issuance of the
court's declaratory judgment. 70 If the plaintiffs accepted the proposal, it
would be binding.7 1 If the defendant failed to make a proposal, or if the
60. Original Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 446(1).
61. Id. art. 2, para. 446(2).
62. See Halladay & Amorese, supra note 28, at 4 (suggesting that the determination
is made by the court).
63. Original Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 446(1).
64. Id. art. 2, para. 446(3); see also Halladay & Amorese, supra note 28, at 4-5 (dis-
cussing the court's "gatekeeper" function).
65. Original Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 446(3). The phrase "manifestly
unfounded" is the Italian procedural equivalent to the American 12(b)(6) mechanism of
"failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
66. Original Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 446(3).
67. See id. art. 2, para. 446(2).
68. Id. art. 2, para. 446(4).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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plaintiffs rejected it, the case moved to a "chamber of conciliation" (camera
di conziliazione)-a three-lawyer panel consisting of representatives from
the plaintiff, the defendant, and the court.72 The chamber of conciliation
rendered a final and binding determination of damages for individual class
members based on the criteria prescribed by the court in its declaratory
judgment. 73
Fifth, the res judicata provision for class action judgments distin-
guished between future individual actions and future collective actions
against the same defendant. A class action judgment had no preclusive
effect on individual actions by consumers who did not participate as class
members or joined as independent parties before the final determination
in the case. 74 But, the first class action judgment precluded future class
actions brought against the same defendant on the same set of issues.7 5
D. A Comparison of the Original Draft with Other European Group
Litigation Devices and the American Class Action System
Compared to other European group litigation devices, the original
draft of the Italian class action system was similar to the Germanic Ver-
bandsklage, or Public Interest Organization's Action. 76 This kind of action
is allowed in two categories of cases: (1) an organization can seek review of
an executive agency's decision on behalf of its members; or (2) consumer
organizations can sue for declaratory relief or seek an injunction against
businesses for misleading advertising or using unfair terms in their stan-
dard form contracts.7 7 Unlike Verbandsklage, however, the original draft
was more liberal on standing; organizations could sue on behalf of plain-
tiffs outside their membership, as long as the organization was adequately
representative of those plaintiffs' interests. 78 But more importantly, as to
remedy, the organization was not limited to seeking declaratory relief or
injunction and could bring an action for damages. 79
It is true that other European group litigation devices provide relief in
the form of damages. The prime example is the "model suit" created by the
72. Id. art. 2, para. 446(6).
73. Id.
74. Id. art. 2, para. 446(5).
75. The final draft clarifies this point, which was left vague in the original draft.
Final Draft, supra note 10, art. 49, para. 14.
76. See Walter, supra note 15, at 375-76 (describing the details of this type of collec-
tive action under Swiss and German law); see, e.g., Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wet-
tewerb [Unfair Competition Act], June 7, 1909, RGBl. at 499 (F.R.G.); Gesetz zur
Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen [Standard Contract Forms
Act], Dec. 9, 1976, BGBl I at 3317 (F.R.G.); Loi fkderale sur l' galite entre femmes et
homes [Loi sur l'galite, Leg] [Act to Establish Equality Between Men and Women], srt.
7(1), Mar. 24, 1995, SR 151 (Switz.).
77. Walter, supra note 15, at 375.
78. Original Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 446(2).
79. Original Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 446(1).
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German Capital Markets Model Case Act.80 In this system, plaintiffs who
are similarly injured agree in advance to bring the case of a single model
plaintiff to judgment. 8 1 This representative case sets controlling legal prin-
ciples for all similar claims brought by the other plaintiffs in the future.8
2
So, for example, if the defendant's liability is determined in the test case,
that determination controls in future cases where plaintiffs similarly
injured sue separately for a determination of their damages. 83 The Ger-
man model suit, however, does not provide for the "expeditious resolution"
of a large number of claims in the same action.8 4 By contrast, the original
draft of the Italian system did; recovery was determined at the conclusion
of the case for all those who decided to opt in the class.8 5
Some European countries provide expeditious resolutions of large
numbers of claims for damages in one stroke through legislative means-
the so-called "funds solutions."'8 6 For example, the German Parliament cre-
ated a fund for the victims of the drug Contergan, which was prescribed to
pregnant women to treat nausea and vomiting associated with morning
sickness, after the drug was found to cause birth defects. 87 These top-
down solutions, however, stand in stark contrast with a class action regime
that "allow[s] non-state actors to assume the collective responsibility" that
the funds solutions reserve exclusively for the state.88 Unlike funds solu-
tions, the original draft of the Italian class action system provided for the
expeditious resolution of large numbers of claims for damages through bot-
tom-up, private means.8 9
To summarize, the original draft of the Italian class action system had
the potential to accomplish what the other main European group litigation
devices-Verbandsklage and the model suit-cannot, namely expeditious
resolution of a large number of similar claims for damages.90 Unlike the
80. Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz [Act on the Initiation of Model Case Pro-
ceedings in Respect of Investors in the Capital Markets], Aug. 16, 2005, BGBI. I at 2437
(F.R.G.) [hereinafter Model Case Proceeding Act].
81. See id. § 8, para. 2 (directing the Higher Regional Court to designate a model
plaintiff from the pool of plaintiffs in light of the amount at issue and any agreement
made among the plaintiffs).
82. See id. §16 (describing the effect of the model case ruling).
83. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 16, at 182.
84. See id. at 182-83. But see Walter, supra note 15, at 375 (arguing that the deter-
mination of liability in such cases usually forces the defendant to settle with all the
plaintiffs similarly injured).
85. See Original Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 446(6).
86. See Walter, supra note 15, at 376 (discussing Germany's version of funds
solutions).
87. Id.
88. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 16, at 209. The relative merits of top-down
state decision-making, and bottom-up private enforcement, when it comes to the effec-
tive enforcement of plaintiffs' rights, are not the focus of this paper.
89. The potential capture of private rights by politics remains a serious worry about
top-down solutions through legislative means. In a feigned effort to address private
rights, politicians may use legislation against particular companies to "punish enemies
and reward friends." See id. at 201 (arguing for the independence of private rights
enforcement from politics).
90. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
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fund solutions, it could accomplish this objective through private rather
than state legislative means.9 1 Hence, the new Italian class action regime,
as formulated in the original draft, constituted a significant advance over
other European legal mechanisms advancing similar policy objectives. The
regime promised to bring to Europe for the first time the American-style
class action for damages.92
The class action regime contemplated in the original draft differed,
however, from its American counterpart in certain fundamental respects,
including each of the five elements discussed above.93 Moreover, the
regime emerged in a legal context that until very recently discouraged
"entrepreneurial litigation"94 by banning contingency fees for plaintiffs'
attorneys. 9 5 A comparison between the original draft and the American
class action in federal courts will lay the groundwork for evaluating the
original draft's efficacy as an instrument for enforcing plaintiffs' rights.
In the United States federal courts, class actions are governed by Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 96 Rule 23(a) permits any mem-
ber of the class to bring an action on behalf of other members as long as
(1) the class is large enough that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representatives are typical of other members in the class,
and (4) the representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class. 9 7 By contrast, standing under the original draft did not explic-
itly include any of the requirements of Rule 23; there was merely a general
requirement that the court find a collective interest suitable for class action
representation. 9 8 Indeed, standing did not extend to just any class mem-
ber. Only certain organizations registered with the Ministry of Economic
Development and other organizations that were adequately representative
of the collective consumer interests at stake could bring an action on
behalf of a class. 99 No matter how liberally the courts read the require-
ment, one thing was clear: class members would not have been able to
bring an action in their individual capacities as members of the class but,
instead, would have had to do so through the intermediation of an
organization. 10 0
91. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
92. See Halladay & Amorese, supra note 28, at 3.
93. See supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
94. See generally Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 42 (describing
entrepreneurial litigation in the class action context and discussing its vices and
virtues).
95. On July 4, 2006, the Italian parliament repealed the regulations providing for
"the setting of obligatory fixed rates or minimum tariffs, i.e., the prohibition on agreeing
on fees linked to the attainment of the objectives pursued," thus allowing for contingent
attorneys' fees. See Decreto Legge 4 Luglio 2006, n. 223, art. 2, para. 1(a), Gazz. Uff. 4
Luglio 2006, n. 153 [hereinafter Decree-Law No. 2231.
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
97. FED. R. Cv. P. 23(a).
98. Original Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 446(3).
99. Id. art. 2, para. 446(2).
100. See Halladay & Amorese, supra note 28, at 4.
Cornell International Law Journal
The most striking difference between the two systems, however, con-
cerns class membership. Under Rule 23(c), the court excludes from the
class only members who request exclusion.10 1 The American system repre-
sents the opt-out version of class membership-one is automatically a
member of the class unless, upon notice, one elects not to participate. 10 2
By contrast, the original draft proposed an opt-in system-one was not
automatically a member of the class and those who intend to participate
could become members only after communicating in writing to the propo-
nent of the action their decision to join the class. 10 3 The opt-out/opt-in
distinction is significant in evaluating the effectiveness of the original draft
because of concerns about potential plaintiffs' inertia in taking affirmative
steps to join the class, and the lack of incentive for defendants to settle the
case in an opt-in model. 10 4
II. The Effectiveness of the Italian System Under the Original Draft
A. Concerns About the Effectiveness of the Original Draft
From a social policy point of view, a class action system is a private
mechanism for enforcing plaintiffs' rights and deterring future wrongful
action on the part of prior offenders. 10 5 The system's effectiveness in pur-
suing these goals depends in part on its financing. 10 6 The system allows
for collective litigation of claims that are too small to be litigated one-by-
one. 10 7 For example, the mechanism makes a significant practical differ-
ence in the enforcement of consumer protection laws where the claims are
typically small and the victims typically numerous. 10 8 Understandably,
this is also the context in which the group litigation devices in Italy, and
more generally in Europe, are designed to operate.' 0 9 By aggregating small
claims into one action, the system renders the cost of litigation non-prohib-
itive for individual consumers.'1 0
At the end of the day, however, there will still be some costs, and,
unless a class action system appropriately addresses its source of funding,
the system itself risks becoming largely ineffective. Hence, from a system
designer's point of view, an important question always is, who will end up
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v).
102. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(3)(B).
103. Original Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 446(2).
104. See Halladay & Amorese, supra note 28, at 5.
105. See generally Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 41 (examining pri-
vate enforcement and the behavior of attorneys who specialize in class action litigation).
106. Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 6, at 225 (discussing "facilitative value" of class
actions); see also id., at 236 (noting that, in determining whether an attorney is an ade-
quate representative of a class, courts often scrutinize the personal finances of the plain-
tiffs attorney because the burden of funding the litigation).
107. Id. at 225.
108. Id.
109. See discussion supra Part l.B.
110. See Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 41, at 685-86 (discussing
economic interests in class action litigation).
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bearing the upfront costs of litigation in a class action?"' The individual
consumer is out of the question. After all, the system is in place to address
the consumer's liquidity problem in bringing his own lawsuit. So expect-
ing him to foot the litigation bill for the whole class is unrealistic in the
normal case. There are, however, three other candidates for bearing the
financing burden: the plaintiffs' attorneys, consumer organizations, and
the government.
The entrepreneurial attorney is the financier and "motor force" of the
class action system in the United States. 12 The explanation for this is sim-
ple: clients are often unaware that they possess actionable claims.1 3 It is
the attorneys who can identify the illegal conduct that gives rise to such
claims and then identify the claimholders themselves. 1 4 The attorneys
assume this task for their self-interest. Under the contingency fee system,
the attorney's profit is a percentage of plaintiffs' recovery. 1 5 The contin-
gency fee system allows the attorney to fund the litigation." 6 The attor-
ney's expertise as a litigation specialist allows him to allocate energy and
resources in those cases that offer the most profitable contingent fee and,
indirectly, the largest benefit for plaintiff class members. 1 1 7 The amount of
recovery might not be the best proxy for the system's effectiveness, but it is
a useful one. Moreover, the system has a certain financial stability because
attorneys can achieve portfolio diversification by handling a large number
of lawsuits, in contrast to plaintiffs who are involved in only one case. 1 18
The original draft of the Italian class action system seemed to remove
the entrepreneurial attorney from the picture by giving consumer organiza-
tions exclusive standing to sue on behalf of a class, thus depriving the sys-
tem of what in the American experience is its main motor force. 11 9 The
underlying worry was that consumer organizations, unlike entrepreneurial
attorneys, would not be able to secure funding to finance class actions. 1 20
The worry is understandable when one considers the possible funding
alternatives for a suit brought by a consumer organization.
The government is one possible funding alternative. For some com-
mentators, this alternative is not viable because government "[flunding is
never certain, and in times of austerity consumer organizations may find
111. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 16, at 197-98.
112. Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 6, at 288; see also Issacharoff & Miller, supra
note 16, at 199.
113. Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 42, at 900.
114. See id. at 885.
115. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settle-
ments: An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIR. LEGAL STUD. 27, 32 (2004). This is not just analyti-
cally true; empirical studies show that "the level of client recovery is by far the most
important determinant of the attorney fee amount." Id. at 28.
116. Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 16, at 198.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (discussing standing in the Italian
system).
120. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 16, at 199-201 (analyzing the funding prob-
lem of funding facing consumer organizations).
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that their budgets are among the first to be slashed." 121 A different con-
cern is that "organizations . ..funded by public authorities .. . [may]
become[] captive to politics." 12 2 Since the independence of consumer
groups from politics is undermined when the government foots the bill,
there is no guarantee that the class action device will be used as an effective
mechanism for enforcing consumer rights rather than as a tactical weapon
for clubbing political enemies. 123
Another alternative source of funding could be the consumer organiza-
tions' own membership. 124 Organizations could charge their members suf-
ficiently high dues to cover anticipated litigation costs. Two problems
plague this approach. First, the solution gives rise to a free-rider problem:
if the consumer organization brings an action on behalf of all those
injured, then nonmembers will be able to share in the benefit of recovery
without sharing in any of its CoStS. 12 5 When that happens, the organiza-
tions' ability to attract members is seriously compromised. Second, even if
the organizations bring actions only on behalf of their members, it is
unrealistic to expect members to invest in membership dues in exchange
for the mere hope that someday they might be able to share in a class
action recovery. 126 This is especially true in the consumer context where
potential recovery for individual class members is small.
A straightforward solution would be for the organizations to condition
membership, and thus indirectly potential benefits, on taking a cut from
the members' recovery if the class action succeeds. 127 This is not an
option in most European jurisdictions, however, because of the ban on con-
tingency fees. 128 Moreover, most European countries have a "loser pays
costs" system, which requires the losing side to pay the other side's attor-
neys' fees. 129 If the case succeeds, the consumer organization stands to be
compensated for the cost of litigation, and if the case fails, the organization
is on the hook for paying the defendant's attorneys' fees. So, at the end of
the day, the organization has a lot to lose in bringing a class action. This
decision matrix renders the prospects of consumer organizations pursuing
a class action highly unlikely.
In summary, there was a legitimate worry that consumer organiza-
tions would not be able to secure funding to finance their class action liti-
gation under the original draft. In giving consumer organizations exclusive
standing in a class action, the original draft seemed to render the system
economically unworkable and ultimately ineffective.
The financing issue was only one of the concerns about the effective-
ness of the original draft; the other was the opt-in requirement for class
121. Id. at 201.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 200.
125. See id. at 200-01.
126. See id. at 201.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 198.
129. See Loser Pays, supra note 15, at 1863.
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membership. 130 The Italian law required potential class members to notify
the representative plaintiff, in this case the consumer organization, of their
intention to join the class. 13 ' Commentators highlight three potential
problems that the opt-in feature can generate.
The first problem is the prospect of low participation by plaintiffs. 132
Recall that part of the rationale behind a class action system is to enforce
claims that are too small to be pursued individually by bringing them
together in the same action. 13 3 From that perspective, a class action system
that fails to bring together several claimholders in the same suit under-
mines its own raison d'etre of making individual unmarketable claims col-
lectively marketable. Consensus has it that an opt-in system fails at doing
just that. 134 An often-quoted source of support for this consensus is the
Eisenberg and Miller study on class action plaintiffs' behavior in the opt-
out system, which shows that in the face of notification "class members
usually do nothing."1 3 5 The study found that "on average less than [one]
percent of class members opt-out and about [one] percent of class mem-
bers object to class-wide settlements." 13 6 Moreover, opt-out rates vary by
case type, with the lowest rate of opt-out at 0.2 percent in consumer protec-
tion cases. 13 7 Considering that the opt-in system requires the consumer to
take affirmative steps to join the class, the consumer's tendency to do noth-
ing buttresses the expectation that participation in the op-in system will be
low.
The second problem is that the opt-in system imposes a low level of
deterrence for class action defendants. 138 This concern is related to the
insufficiency of participation problem-the lower the number of plaintiffs
who participate in the action, the lower the amount of potential recovery.
Because deterrence is thought to increase in direct proportion to the defen-
dant's monetary penalty, a low turnout of plaintiffs undermines a mean-
ingful threat against future wrongful acts on the part of defendants. 139
130. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 16, at 202-08 (comparing opt-in and opt-out
mechanisms).
131. Original Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 446(2).
132. Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 16, at 203-06.
133. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
134. See Rachel K. Alexander, Federal Tails and State Puppy Dogs: Preempting Parallel
State Wage Claims to Preserve the Integrity of Federal Group Wage Actions, 58 AM. U. L.
REv. 515, 544 (2009) ("[Tihe opt-in requirement substantially limits the size of the
group action, generating participation between only fifteen and thirty percent.").
135. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in
Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1532
(2004) (demonstrating that class members seldom opt-out by analyzing thousands of
class actions from 1993 through 2003); see also Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 16, at
203 (noting "class members usually do nothing" when informed of their status).
136. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 135, at 1532.
137. Id. (finding a mean opt-out rate of 4.6% in four mass tort cases, 2.2% in three
employment discrimination cases, and below 0.2% in thirty-nine consumer protection
cases); see also id. at 1549 (providing table listing opt-out statistics by case type).
138. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 16, at 207 (comparing the deterrent effect of
opt-in and opt-out systems).
139. See id.
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Low deterrence is, therefore, as serious a concern as low participation.
The third problem with the opt-in system is what commentators call
"insufficient finality." 140 Under the opt-out model, the party at fault can
quantify its overall exposure by being in a position to identify those who
have chosen to pursue their claims independently. 14 1 By contrast, in the
opt-in system, the party at fault is only aware of his potential exposure in
relation to the members of the class because "only those who affirmatively
join the litigation are bound by the outcome" and cannot participate in
future litigation against the same defendant over the same set of issues.14 2
Since in the opt-in system the defendant cannot calculate his exposure to
future litigation, neither can he calculate the value of the original class
action in a way that can guide his settlement decisions. To that extent, the
opt-in system undermines the incentive of the defendant to settle a class
action. Some authors convincingly argue that "peace [for the defendant]
indirectly benefits members of the class because defendants will pay more
for settlements that offer assurances against future litigation."'143 So, insuf-
ficient finality seemingly undermines the system's effectiveness in enforc-
ing plaintiffs' rights.
B. Addressing the Concerns About the Original Draft
The previous section described three concerns that might be raised
about the original draft of the Italian class action system: lack of funding,
insufficient plaintiff participation, and insufficient finality for class action
defendants. This section argues that these concerns were unwarranted.
The funding concern relied on the premise that barriers to
entrepreneurial litigation undermine the source of funding for a class
action system. 144 Traditionally, the main barrier to entrepreneurial litiga-
tion in Italy and other European countries has been the ban on contin-
gency fees for plaintiffs' attorneys. 145 On July 4, 2006, however, the Italian
parliament repealed the ban on contingent attorneys' fees.14 6
Admittedly, only consumer organizations had standing under the
original draft, 147 but the restriction, by itself, does not undermine the pros-
pects of entrepreneurial litigation. Various modes of financing could intro-
duce or substitute the role played by the entrepreneurial attorney in the
140. See id. at 206-07.
141. See Halladay & Amorese, supra note 28, at 6.
142. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 16, at 206.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 197-98.
145. See Taruffo, supra note 13, at 415 ("[One] thing that seems unacceptable to
Europeans is the U.S. system of contingent fees and particularly the practice of propor-
tioned fees, in which the plaintiffs lawyer gets a percentage of the amount recovered.");
Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 16, at 198 ("Attorneys are good litigation funders. ...
[T]hey have the ability to assess the value of suits.... Because attorneys handle numer-
ous lawsuits, moreover, they can achieve portfolio diversification in ways not possible
for ordinary clients, who are usually involved in only one.").
146. See Decree-Law No. 223, supra note 95, art. 2. The decree lifts "the prohibition
on agreeing on fees linked to the attainment of the objectives pursued."
147. See Original Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 446(1).
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American system. 148 For example, consumer organizations could auction-
out their rights to sue to law firms who could better assess and diversify
the costs of class action litigation. 14 9 In addition, even active and sophisti-
cated parties with a genuine stake in the controversy, like consumer organi-
zations, could be "captured" by entrepreneurial attorneys who could then
use the contingency fee system already in place to organize, finance, and
lead the class actions.15 0 Alternatively, consumer organizations could play
the role of the entrepreneurial attorneys by conditioning membership in
the organization with a financial stake in potential class action recovery
now that this type of agreement is enforceable under the Italian law.' 15
And there was always the possibility that entrepreneurial attorneys would
themselves create consumer organizations that are "adequately representa-
tive" in the sense required for standing.
Hence, at least in principle, entrepreneurial litigation under the origi-
nal draft was no longer impossible in Italy. It is important to emphasize
the significant shift from the old system. The opportunities for financing
sketched in the previous paragraph did not exist under the old, "loser-pays-
all-costs" rule for attorneys' fees, which continues to be the norm in
Europe.15 2 In that system, potential exposure to the high litigation costs of
the defendant would arguably incline a consumer organization to behave
timidly even when faced with a meritorious suit in the absence of some
countervailing financial reward that would make the risk worth taking. 1
5 3
The two remaining concerns were those about the effects of the sys-
tem's opt-in feature: insufficient plaintiff participation and insufficient
finality for class action defendants. The argument that plaintiff participa-
tion in the opt-in system would be low relies on an unwarranted inference.
The argument infers that the consumers in an opt-in system will do nothing
when faced with the choice of joining a class action from the fact that the
American consumers in the opt-out system usually do nothing when faced
with the choice of excluding themselves from one. 154 This argument is
148. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 16, at 197-202 (suggesting various ways in
which consumer organizations with standing could finance class action litigation using
a system of contingent fees).
149. See id. at 198 (explaining rationale for attorney-funded class actions).
150. Id. at 196-97.
151. See id. at 200-01 (discussing conditional memberships in consumer organiza-
tions); Decree-Law No. 223, supra note 95, art. 2 (allowing agreements that condition
professional fees on the achievement of the objectives pursued).
152. See Rowe, supra note 15, at 159 ("Loser-pays rules governing liability for attorney
fees [are] followed nearly everywhere but in the United States .... ); Loser Pays, supra
note 15, at 1863 (noting that the American system, under which parties bear their own
litigation costs, "stands in sharp contrast to the ... [rule] that the loser must pay the
successful party's attorneys' fees" followed in most European nations).
153. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 16, at 200 ("[Under the loser-pays-cost sys-
tem,] if a case succeeds, the benefits of the judgment go to class members rather than to
the organization. If a case fails, a representative organization has to pay both its attor-
neys' fees and the defendants' attorneys' fees.").
154. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
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spurious. 155 It is no surprise that when notified about a class action, con-
sumers in the opt-out system rarely decide to exclude themselves from it:
their claims are usually individually unsustainable. 156 Understandably,
these plaintiffs would not choose to opt out of a lawsuit with some poten-
tial recovery, however small, when there is little prospect of pursuing their
claims independently. In other words, the behavior of the opt-out con-
sumer is rational: if the consumer "does nothing, he loses nothing other
than an essentially worthless right to bring his own lawsuit, but he gains
the right to participate in the proceeds of the litigation."' 57 By contrast,
the opt-in consumer faces the inverse choice: if he does nothing he gets
nothing, but if he joins the action, he gets something, that is, the right to
participate in the recovery. 158
Admittedly, the consumer's choice in the opt-in system would depend
on, among other things, the quality of notice about the class action and the
ease of participation.159 But if potential class members are properly noti-
fied and participation is easy-for example, through signing a standard
opt-in form and mailing it in a pre-paid envelope-there is no reason to
expect anything less than robust participation. 160 This should be particu-
larly true for plaintiffs subject to the Italian regime who are consumers
with otherwise unmarketable claims and nothing to gain by holding out,
but nothing to lose and something to gain by joining in. More importantly,
under the original draft, the plaintiff had an extended time-window to join
the action-from the moment notice was given to the time the court issued
a dispositive ruling in the case.161 The extended opt-in period would have
played a significant role in increasing participation as it allowed potential
plaintiffs an opportunity to learn about the course of litigation and make
an informed decision about whether to join based on the likelihood of suc-
cess at the crucial time right before the court determined defendant's
liability.
In addition, the American commentators who predict insufficient par-
ticipation in the opt-in model fail to view it in conjunction with its compan-
ion piece in the majority of European group litigation devices: restricted
standing. 162 The relevance of restricted standing to participation is con-
spicuous in the extreme hypothetical case where the system restricts stand-
ing with respect to a type of claim-for example, those based on the
155. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 16, at 204 (noting the problem with infer-
ring that opt-in rates will be low from the data showing low opt-out rates in the Ameri-
can system).
156. See Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 6, at 225 (explaining the rationale for a class
action system as a means to allow collective litigation of claims that are too small to be
litigated one-by-one).
157. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 16, at 204.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 206.
160. See id.
161. See Original Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 446(2).
162. See, e.g. Group Litigation, supra note 8; see also Issacharoff & Miller, supra note
16, at 192 ("Class action procedures in Europe often restrict lead plaintiff rights to orga-
nizations that represent consumer interests.").
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defendant's anticompetitive conduct-to only one representative consumer
organization. 16 3 In that case, each potential class member has only one
chance to pursue his claim against a defendant, which is when the con-
sumer organization brings it. As indicated earlier, the consumer cannot
pursue the claim individually in the future because it is too small to justify
the cost of litigation, and no other organization can bring the same claim
on behalf of a group of consumers because the law restricts standing to
only one entity. 16 4 Understandably, the plaintiffs incentive to join the
class action is strongest in the case where only one organization has stand-
ing to bring a particular type of claim because in that case the plaintiffs
opportunity to recover is unique. But, generalizing from this extreme case,
one would expect the consumer's joinder incentive to vary inversely with
the number of consumer organizations that enjoy standing-the fewer the
organizations, the rarer the consumer's opportunity to bring his claim and
the stronger his incentive to join a class action the first chance he gets.
The original draft contained another unique feature that was designed
to play a role in increasing plaintiff participation. As discussed in Part I,
under the original draft, a class action judgment would preclude future
class actions against the same defendant on the same set of issues. 165 The
preclusive effect of a class action judgment rendered unique the opportu-
nity to sue the same defendant on the same set of issues collectively with
other consumers similarly injured. The uniqueness of this opportunity
makes the incentive to opt in the action that is most likely to go to judg-
ment first that much stronger and the worry about insufficient participa-
tion that much more unmotivated.
The remaining concern involved the prospects of insufficient finality
for class action defendants in an opt-in system. Some commentators have
already noticed, however, that it is quite possible for an opt-in system to
secure the finality guaranteed by the opt-out model. 16 6 For example, the
system could allow those who do not opt in to bring individual actions in
the future but bar them from participating in future class actions. 16 7 Since
pursuing consumer claims on an individual basis is not economically via-
ble, such an opt-in system would effectively bar any future actions against
the defendant and, thus, guarantee for him global peace. As explained in
the previous paragraph, the original draft did something very similar: it
gave the consumer class member a one-time chance to opt in a class action,
not by barring him from participating in a future class action, but by bar-
ring future class actions against the same defendant on the same set of
issues. 168 Hence, the res judicata effect of a class action judgment under
the original draft puts the concern about insufficient finality to rest.
163. It is important to note that the Italian system does not restrict standing to only
one organization for every type of claim. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
165. Final Draft, supra note 10, art. 49, para. 14.
166. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 16, at 207.
167. Id. ("A rule that allows only one opportunity to participate in a class action
would accomplish effective global peace.").
168. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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In summary, it is important to emphasize that the garden-variety wor-
ries about other European group litigation devices did not apply to the
original draft of the Italian class action system. The original draft guaran-
teed a way of financing through the mechanism of contingency fees; it pro-
vided a strong incentive for plaintiffs to participate in the system both by
restricting standing and offering them a one-shot chance to enforce their
claims through the class action device; and it secured global peace and
finality for the defendant from collective litigation initiated by those who
failed to opt in the first class action that went to judgment. Other
problems, however, plagued the original draft.
C. The Achilles' Heel of the Original Draft
A contingency fee structure for awarding attorneys' fees can create cer-
tain "misincentives" for the plaintiffs' attorneys. 169 In Chesny v. Marek,170
Judge Richard Posner illustrated the attorneys' misincentive to settle an
action prematurely through the following hypothetical:
Suppose a defendant offers $100,000, the contingent fee is 30 percent
regardless of when the litigation ends, and the lawyer is sure he can get a
judgment for $120,000 if the case is tried but knows that it will cost him, in
time and other expenses, $8,000 to try it. His client will be better off if the
case is tried, for after paying the lawyer's fee he will put $84,000 in his
pocket rather than $70,000 if it is settled. But the lawyer will be worse off,
since his additional fee, $6,000 ($36,000 - $30,000) will be less than the
trial costs of $8,000 that he must incur. 17 1
The misincentive to settle prematurely was much stronger under the
original draft. Consider the situation where two consumer organizations'
class actions, with their own opt-in class members, are pending against the
same defendant. Call these actions A and B. Under the original draft, if A
was settled, B was precluded and vice versa. 172 In this context, there was a
clear incentive for both plaintiffs' attorneys to settle their suits prematurely:
if B was settled first, A was precluded and A's attorney got nothing in attor-
neys' fees because there would be no recovery for his class members. Since
the same was true for B's attorney, the predicament would create a race to
the bottom where both sides would try to underbid each other with respect
to settlement. The losers of the underbidding contests would not just be
the plaintiffs' attorneys; the underbidding would adversely affect the overall
recovery of consumers as well. The effectiveness of the class action system
in enforcing consumer rights and deterring future wrongful acts on the
part of defendants would be compromised to the same extent.
169. Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The Pentium Papers: A Case Study of
Collective Institutional Investor Activism in Litigation, 38 ARiz. L. REv. 559, 566-67
(1996); see also Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 42, at 887 (tracing misincentives,
in part, to the practice of direct plaintiff solicitation and a lack of referral process in the
legal profession).
170. 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983).
171. Id. at 477.
172. See Original Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 446(5); Final Draft, supra note 10,
art. 49, para. 14.
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One might argue that a situation where the defendant faces two or
more pending class actions would not be common enough to make the
problem pervasive. But the temptation for the defendant to find ways of
"promoting" other class actions upon being served with one is just too
great to be underestimated. 1 73 How could the Italian system, then, solve
this problem?
The most straightforward solution would be to legislatively change the
preclusive effect of the first class action judgment. This would remove the
incentive to underbid and settle prematurely in the context of two or more
pending class actions. But, as indicated in the previous section, the preclu-
sive effect of the first judgment affects the robustness of opt-in participa-
tion in a class action and, more importantly, allows the defendant to
achieve finality. Absent the coercive choice created by the preclusive effect
of the first class action judgment, the consumers' incentive to opt in a class
action is weakened and, with no guarantee of finality, the defendant's
incentive to settle the suit is seriously compromised.1 74 In other words, a
system adopting the opt-in model is forced to choose between the undesir-
able effect of underbidding contests and insufficient finality coupled with
weak participation, each with its negative consequences for the enforce-
ment of consumer rights.
An alternative solution would be to restrict standing for each type of
admissible claim to only one consumer organization. This would prevent
the predicament of two pending class actions with their potential for an
underbidding contest. For example, the law could restrict standing in a
class action for anticompetitive conduct to only one consumer organiza-
tion. This possibility was consistent with the proposed law insofar as there
were no floor restrictions on the number of consumer organizations that
were guaranteed standing under the original draft.175
Restricting standing by type of claim to only one consumer organiza-
tion, however, would give that organization monopoly power in the legal
representation market for that type of claim. And "[ftor class actions, no
less than for any economic market, monopoly power carries the usual
potential for higher prices and lower output."'1 7 6 In the class action con-
text, "higher prices come in the form of excessive fees for class counsel,
and lower output consists of low-quality representation of the class in the
form of an inadequate settlement."' 7 7 Again, the ultimate result would be
underenforcement of consumer rights and weak deterrence of wrongful
behavior.
The potential for collusive settlements between the representative con-
sumer organizations and defendants exacerbates the concern about inade-
173. The restriction on standing might cabin this opportunity to some extent. See
Original Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 446(1).
174. See supra text accompanying note 165.
175. See. Original Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 446(1).
176. Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class
Action, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 149, 164 (2003).
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quate settlements. 1 78 As Professor Coffee has shown, where class action
battles are fought between repeat players who have litigated and negotiated
settlements in similar cases many times in the past "the defendants receive
a 'cheaper' than arm's length settlement and the plaintiffs' attorneys receive
in some form an above-market attorneys' fee." 179 The potential for collu-
sive settlement is increased where the consumer organization is not just a
repeat player but the only player in the litigation and settlement of a type of
claim. In fact, the potential for collusive settlement between the party in
control of the litigation and the defendant is so significant in the consumer
context that some commentators have suggested an auction approach for
consumer class actions, whereby bidders compete to buy the consumers'
rights and then pursue these rights independently and on their own
account.180 Restricting standing to only one organization is a move in the
opposite direction, increasing both the incentive and opportunity for collu-
sive settlement between consumer organizations and class action
defendants.
The last two sections reveal the implicit strategy of the original draft.
Realizing that an opt-in model left on its own could not secure finality for
defendants, the draft tried to compensate by restricting standing to a few
organizations and by making class action judgments preclusive on collec-
tive actions against the same defendants on the same set of issues. These
attempts indeed fixed the insufficient finality problem. But they both came
at a high cost: the outcome was either an underbidding settlement contest
between representative organizations or an increase in the potential for col-
lusive behavior between the representative organizations and class action
defendants. Both scenarios would result in inadequate settlements and,
consequently, a class action system that would be ineffective at enforcing
consumer rights and deterring future wrongful acts on the part of
defendants.
D. The Final Draft and Its Problems
The final draft enacted into law in January 2010 overlaps with the
original draft in many respects, including the nature of admissible claims,
the opt-in requirement for class membership, 18 1 and the res judicata effect
of class action judgments. 18 2 There are, however, significant differences
that concern, among other things, the standing requirements, 183 the notice
requirement, 18 4 the trial process' 85 and the determination of damages. 18 6
178. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs Attorney's Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 44-45 (1991) (discussing the potential for collusive settle-
ments as an agency problem).
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COLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1365, 1367 (1995).
180. See Macey & Miller, supra note 178, at 105.
181. See Final Draft, supra note 10, art. 43, paras. 3, 9.
182. See id. art. 43, paras. 1, 14.
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In particular, the final draft liberalizes standing by allowing individual con-
sumers to bring a class action, in addition to the consumer organizations
that enjoyed standing under the original draft.187 The trial process is also
different: unlike in the original draft, the defendant does not have an
opportunity to make a settlement offer after the court determines that the
claim is admissible. The final draft also renounces the three-party chamber
of conciliation as the forum for making a determination of damages; 188
damages are determined at the end of the trial by the sentence of the
court.189 The law expands the court's management and sanctioning
authority over the case to include the authority to determine the opt-in
period,190 measures for the presentation of proof, rules for disciplining the
parties, and the formalities of notice to potential plaintiffs. 191 How do
these changes affect the traditional concerns raised about European group
litigation devices, particularly plaintiff participation and finality for class
action defendants?
At first glance, the new standing provision re-invites the concern about
low participation. 192 But this concern might be premature when one con-
siders that the other variable affecting participation, the res judicata effect
of class action judgments, remains the same as in the original draft. More
specifically, the first class action judgment precludes future class actions
against the same defendant on the same set of issues. 193 As indicated ear-
lier, the unique opportunity to bring a suit through the class action vehicle
might serve as a strong incentive for consumers with otherwise unmarket-
able claims to opt in the class. 194 As in the original draft, the res judicata
provision also puts to rest the concern about finality. 195
The final draft also seems to address the competitive underbidding
scenario created by two pending class actions, a concern raised in the pre-
vious section. Under the final draft, the judge will consolidate multiple
pending lawsuits brought against the same defendant in the same tribu-
nal. 196 Moreover, after the judge presiding over the first class action deter-
mines the action's opt-in period, subsequent class actions brought during
that period in other tribunals will be dismissed and the respective plaintiffs
will be given no more than sixty days to bring their actions in the first
tribunal. 1 9 7 The judge in the first action can consolidate these subsequent
actions once they are refiled in the first tribunal. 198 To close the loop, the
185. Id. art. 43, paras. 4-13.
186. Id. art. 43, para. 12.
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law precludes any class actions brought after the opt-in period of the first
class action expires.19 9 Hence, the consolidation procedure seems to take
away from the defendant the opportunity to create a "race to the bottom"
with plaintiffs' attorneys bidding against each other for lower
settlements. 20 0
Despite its initial promise, consolidation gives rise to its own
problems. For example, the "first-to-file" venue provision allows the defen-
dant to control venue by "promoting" the first class action in its favored
tribunal because, as explained in the previous paragraph, all subsequent
actions brought during the first opt-in period against the defendant will be
consolidated in that tribunal.20 1 The ability to control venue carries signif-
icant weight, particularly when one considers the extensive management
and sanctioning authority the final draft grants to the presiding judge.20 2
In addition, the consolidation procedure is fraught with uncertainty.
For example, it is unclear whether the sixty-day window for re-filing subse-
quent class actions in the first tribunal tolls the maximum 120-day opt-in
period 20 3 of the first action, or whether the opt-in period determined in the
first class action controls. If the subsequent class actions toll the 120-day
opt-in period of the first action, the case can, at least theoretically, go on
forever. On the other hand, if the opt-in period determined in the first
class action controls, then the sixty-day window for re-filing the subsequent
action in the first tribunal is less meaningful because, unless brought
within the first opt-in period, the subsequent action is precluded.
Finally, and most importantly, the new opt-in period provision threat-
ens to have an adverse affect on plaintiff participation. Unlike the original
draft, which extended the opt-in period from the time notice was given to
the time the court made a dispositive ruling in the case, 20 4 the final draft
shortens the opt-in period to a maximum of 120 days. 20 5 The restriction
works in conjunction with the res judicata provision to guarantee finality
for class action defendants. But it does so at the cost of undermining plain-
tiff participation. The longer opt-in period in the original draft was impor-
tant for robust participation because it gave potential plaintiffs not only an
opportunity to learn about the progress of a case, but also the maximum
amount of time to make a decision about whether to join based on the
probability of success up until the crucial point when the court was ready
to determine liability.20 6 The final draft, in contrast, calls for an opt-in
decision ab initio20 7 and, in depriving the plaintiff of information about
the course of litigation and its probability for success, it weakens the join-
der incentive. The analysis in the last two sections suggests that the opt-in
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201. Final Draft, supra note 10, art. 43, para. 14.
202. See id. art. 43, para. 9.
203. Id.
204. See Original Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 446(2).
205. Final Draft, supra note 10, art. 43, para. 9.
206. See Original Draft, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 446(2).
207. Final Draft, supra note 10, art. 43, para. 9.
Vol. 43
2010 Italy's Class Action Experiment
model suffers from an inherent instability. The original draft was forced to
choose between the Scylla of insufficient finality and the Charybdis of the
collateral costs that the various maneuvers for securing finality introduce
in the system. The final draft attempts to address these collateral costs
while preserving finality by introducing a procedure for consolidating mul-
tiple actions that are pending during the opt-in period. But, consolidation
succeeds at addressing the collateral costs of the original draft only at the
cost of threatening to undermine robust participation. 20 8 Hence, despite
what some analysts have suggested, 20 9 it might be impossible to implement
rules that compensate for the problems inherent in the opt-in model so as
to secure outcomes similar to those that can be obtained in the American
opt-out regime.
Conclusion
Despite their misgivings, European countries have long flirted with the
idea of implementing some form of American-style class action. Italy's new
experiment is a significant step in that tradition. The experiment is signifi-
cant relative to European group litigation devices, because it institutes for
the first time in the continent a class action regime for damages rather than
behavioral remedies backed up by meager penalties. But the experiment
also betrays the same hesitancy about full-blown American class action
that other European devices imply. Most prominently, the Italian system
comes with an odd res judicata provision, and an opt-in model for class
membership. These features, and the way in which they interact, have seri-
ous consequences for the system's efficacy.
The heart of the problem with the Italian system consists in an inher-
ent instability in the opt-in model for class membership. Systems that
adopt this model, if left unchecked, run the risk of insufficient finality for
class action defendants. At the same time, any attempt to secure finality,
by tinkering with the res judicata effect of class action judgments, or by
restricting standing to decrease the number of class actions, generate their
own serious problems. More specifically, they produce either a high risk
for underbidding settlement wars between class action representatives or
collusive settlements between these representatives and class action
defendants. The attempt to address these collateral problems reintroduces
the concerns about insufficient participation. In either case, the outcome
is underenforcement of consumer rights.
The conclusions are both predictive and analytical in nature. This
article predicts that the Italian system will be ultimately ineffective at
enforcing consumer rights. The more general, analytical point of the study
concerns the opt-in model: despite what some commentators have argued,
208. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
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it might turn out to be impossible to compensate for the inherent problem
of insufficient finality without adversely affecting the effectiveness of the
system as a whole.
